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CASES NOTED
limitations." It may be used as a shield to prevent recovery, but not as a
sword to accomplish recovery. 12
In liberally construing the Federal Torts Claim Act the court in the
noted case has maintained that the United States, by bringing such an
action, submitted itself "to the jurisdiction of the Court for the determina-
tion of all issues that might arise from the accident. .. ."I' Since Congress
has expressly provided for a two year limitation period, it appears that the
court is going beyond the authority created by Congress under the veil of
"liberal interpretation". However, the primary concern of limitation statutes
is one of fairness to a defendant.14 He should not be called upon to defend
a "stale" claim after the evidence has disappeared. In the instant case, the
reason for the rule is not present, Therefore, the conclusion appears sound.
Alan R. Lorber.
TAXATION - CONSTITUTIONALITY OFCLIFFORD REGULATIONS
Petitioner contended that, by authority of one of the Clifford Regula-
tions, the income of a charitable inter-vivos trust was taxable to the
respondent-grantor who had retained a reversionary interest in the corpus,
alleged by petitioner to take effect within ten years from the date of transfer
of the corpus. Held, the trust was of ten years duration. However, a regu-
lation which creates a conclusive presumption that the income is the
settlor's, based solely on the trust duration without regard to who actually
derives the economic benefits, is void as it is arbitrary, unreasonable and
violative of the Fifth Amendment. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Clark, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2421 (7th Cir. March 3, 1933).
Under the Treasury Department's Clifford Regulations,' when the
grantor of a living trust retains a reversionary interest, to take effect within
ten years of the date of transfer, the income received by the beneficiary is
taxable to the grantor, even though by the terms of the instrument he
divests himself of all control over the income, and even though it be used
for general charitable trust purposes.2 The theory is that by virtue of the
short duration of the trust term, the grantor does not part with all of the
11. E.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1934); Beekner v. Katufman, 145 Fla.
152, 198 So. 794 (1940); Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459, 131 So. 324 (1930).
12. Sullivan v. Hoover, 6 F.R.D. 513 (D.D.C. 1947).
13. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D.D.C, 1952).
1-1. Note, 63 1-AIv. L. RpEv. 1177 (1950).
1. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(c) (1), as added by T.D. 5488, Dec. 29,
1945, amended by T.D. 5567, June 30, 1947.
2. In the instant case there were no controls retained by the grantor and the
transfer was irrevocable for the stated tern.
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economic benefits of the property,3 but rather, employs a convenient method
of income tax avoidance. 4
The fact that the brevity of the term is related to the retention of
controls by the grantor has been recognized for some time by the courts.5
However, in the leading case on the subject, Helvering v. Clifford,8 it was
held that no single element is normally decisive, but rather the length of
the trust term should be considered in conjunction with other factors such
as the administrative controls retained and the power to determine bene-
ficial enjoyment.7  The Clifford Regulations are the Treasury's announced
attempt to establish a set of precise rules taken from the broad principles
of the Clifford case,8 But in practical application, they are more than a
mere codification of the Clifford criteria because the regulation treats each
of the factors as an independent ground for taxability;9 whereas under the
interim10 case law, short term trusts were largely held not taxable to the
grantor if no other strings were attached1 1
The peculiar aspect of the holding in the instant case stems from the
3. INT. REv. CODE, § 22(a), generally defines gross income to include ". .. gains
or profits and income derived from any source whatever."; INT. REV. CODE, §§ 166, 167
(provide for the taxability of trust income to the settlor under various conditions).
4. Under § 162(a) of the INT. REV. CODE, a trust is granted an unlimited deduc-
tion for any part of its gross income which is used for charitable purposes authorized
by § 23(o) of the Code. This provision permits an individual to exceed the present
twenty per cent limitation on charitable deductions by transferring the income bearing
corpus in trust. See Guterman, Federal Income Taxation of lnterVivos Trusts, NEW
YORX UNIVERSITY NINTH ANNUAL INSTITuTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, 205 (1951).
However, the grantor's motive in attempting to enlarge the charitable deduction is
irrelevant in determining whether the income is taxable to the grantor. Helvering v.
Achelis, 112 F.2d 929 (2nd Cir. 1940).
5. Learned Hand, J., in Helvering v. Elias, 122 F.2d 171 (2nd Cir. 1941), cert.
den., 314 U.S. 692 (1941) (six and one-half year trust resulted in taxability of income
to grantor) : "There is good reason for such a correlation, because the shorter the term
the more complete is the settlor's real power of management and control regardless of
legal reservations. A trustee who must manage a fund throughout the life of the bene-
ficiary may well refuse to be guided by the counsels of the reversioner; the income is to
be the beneficiary's for a long time, and the reversioner has a correspondingly smaller
stake. But a trustee who will have to account to his beneficiary for only five or six
years and then to the reversioner, is in a very different position; if he is reasonable, he
will heed the reversioner, treat his interest as paramount and be guided by his judgment.
Legal powers of management add very little to such a reversioner's actual control over
the fund while the trust lasts."
6. 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (income of five year trust held taxable to grantor, based
on shortness of term, family nature of the trust and wide administrative controls
retained).
7. id. at 336.
8. Ervin, Clifford Doctrine-Beneficial Enjoyment, 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 603
(1951).
9. See KENNEDY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES (1948),
§ 6.22, 6.23 and Cum. Supp. pp. 78-79 (1953); Guterman, The New Clifford Regula-
tions, 1 TAX. L. REV. 379, 384 (1946); Pavenstedt, The Treasury Legislates: The Dis-
tortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAX L. REV. 7, 9 (1946).
10. Cases decided subsequent to the Clifford Case (Feb. 26, 1940) and prior to
the promulgation of the Clifford Regulations (Dec. 20, 1945).
11. United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1943) (charitable trust of
slightly less than ten years held not taxable to grantor), the court stating on p. 432:
"The term of the trust was not so short, taken alone or in connection with other circum-
stances in the case, as to compel the inference (emphasis added) that the settlor had
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portion of the same regulation which prescribes the method of computing
the length of the trust term.12 Any postponement is considered a new trans-
fer in trust, beginning with the postponement date and ending with the
new termination date. In the instant case, the taxpayer originally created a
five year trust in 1941 with reversion date in 1946. Then in 1942, the termi-
nation date was postponed until 1951. Thus, although the aggregate length
was ten years, the length for tax purposes was computed at nine years by
the Commissioner.' 3  The Tax Court 14 accepted the nine year computa-
tion'5 but held for the taxpayer on other grounds.'8
Therefore, what appears at first to be mere dictum in the principal
case amounts, in the writer's opinion, to a square holding that the regula-
tion is unconstitutional-on the reasoning that the court could not call the
instrument a ten year trust, in derogation of the regulation, 7 without in
effect declaring it to be invalid. The court has ample authority behind its
conviction that a conclusive presumption of beneficial ownership, under
circumstances similar to these, is unconstitutional' 8 and that due process
requires that the taxpayer have an opportunity to meet the burden of proof.
This seems especially true where variable, rather than fixed, factors enter
into the determination of who is the substantial owner of income for tax
purposes. If a regulatory line can reasonably be drawn between substantial
and nonisubstantial ownership determined solely by a term of years, then
apparently it remains for the Treasury or Congress to convince the courts
of that fact by acceptable regulation or statute.
Martin E. Kestenbaum
not parted with the beneficial ownership of the trust principal."; Helvering v. Bok,
132 F2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1942) (six year charitable trust held not taxable to grantor
because no powers of control were reserved); Cory v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 689 (3rd
Cir. 1941), cert. den. 317 U.S. 642 (1942) (court refused to be "hampered by the
calendar" even in a short term trust); Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F.2d 765
(2d Cir. 1941) (four year trust not taxable to settlor because of absence of family
purpose). But cf., Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1941) (shortness of
term held sufficient ground for taxing grantor since he was soon to reacquire complete
dominion).
12. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (c)(1), as added by T.D. 5488, Dec.
29, 1945, amended by T.D. 5567, June 30, 1947.
13. The Commissioner sought to assess the grantor for income of 1946, the year
the regulation took effect.
14. Clark v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1357 (1952).
15. The question before the court was whether the settlor should be taxed on the
charitable trust income "solely because the duration of the trust is nine instead of 10
years .. " Clark v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1357, 1361 (1952).
16. "We do not think Helvering v. Clifford, supra, or section 29.22(a)-21 of
Regulations 111 were intended to or do apply to the income of a trust such as we have
here." Clark v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1357, 1363 (1952).
17. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.22(a)-21(c)(2) (paragraph starting "Any post-
ponement .... " and example following).
I8. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (congressional act which created a
conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years of death were made in con-
templation of death, held violative of Fifth Amendment); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270
U.S. 230 (1926) (conclusive presumption that gifts made within six years of death
were made in contemplation of death for state inheritance tax purposes held violative
of Fourteenth Amendment).
